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In developed economies, trade unions are generally associated with a positive
work environment, including higher wages, increased benefits, reduced wage
negotiation costs, and lower wage inequality and worker turnover (Freeman
1980; Standing 1992). In developing and transition countries characterized by
different employment structures, including the presence of large informal and
unorganized sectors, evidence remains more scarce.¹ However, precisely in such
contexts of low wage levels, inadequate institutional support, and limited provi-
sion of public sector goods and services, trade unions represent a potentially
important collective ‘voice’ for the promotion of worker benefits and welfare.
In the case of Vietnam, the transition to a market economy has, along with a
growing private sector and the parallel equitization of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), led to the formation of new employment relationships and bases for the
establishment of local trade unions. Moreover, in recent years, several changes
have been made to the regulatory framework, including the Labour Code and the
Trade Union Law, which together provide the impetus for formalizing and
strengthening the role of unions. Yet the effectiveness of workplace trade unions
remains questionable due partly to their marginal independence, employer dom-
inance, and the generally low incidence of collective agreements.
It is within this context that the current chapter analyses whether trade unions
are associated with higher wage outcomes, using firm-level survey data on small
and medium-sized (non-state) manufacturing firms in Vietnam over 2013–15
(Rand et al. 2014). The firm panel has been matched with employee data from a
subsample of workers in each year. The survey covers micro-, small, and medium-
sized firms, and I use the World Bank’s classification in terms of the number of
employees. One key advantage of using matched employer–employee data is that
¹ See Eaton et al. (2017) and Schurman and Eaton (2012) for reviews of the growing literature on
trade unions and worker organizing in the informal economy.
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it allows for disentangling worker from firm heterogeneity by controlling for firm
and worker characteristics which could affect both union status and wage out-
comes. Second, in being able to construct a balanced panel of workers some of
whom change union status over time, I am able to control for determining factors
and selected observed time-varying factors that may simultaneously influence the
decision to unionize and subsequent wage outcomes. Third, the availability of
numerous firm-level variables allows for identifying valid instruments so as to
capture time-varying unobserved characteristics which, if left unaccounted for,
could bias the results. In line with similar studies, the analysis shows a union
member wage premium of around 9–22 per cent, depending on the econometric
approach. An earlier version of this study undertakes some further robustness
checks revealing considerable variation along the conditional wage distribution,
with the union wage differential being substantially higher for the top quantiles
(Torm 2018). This in turn calls into question the ability of unions to promote the
rights and interests of all workers and their accountability for doing so. Moreover,
Torm (2018) shows that the union-related wage gain is individual, arising directly
from being a union member, rather than a spill-over effect from the presence of
unions.
In Section 11.2 I provide a selective overview of the existing literature and
theoretical background. Section 11.3 discusses the Vietnamese context, while
Section 11.4 describes the data, the methodology and the variables included in
the empirical analysis. Section 11.5 presents the main results and Section 11.6
concludes.
11.2 Literature and Theory
Unions provide workers with a mechanism through which to shape their employ-
ment relationship and working environment, by, for instance, improving work-
place communication, increasing wages and benefits, and reducing labour
turnover (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Thus, through serving as an agent for a
firm’s employees, a union can take on many different roles and be associated with
numerous outcomes, as evidenced by the vast number of trade union studies,
covering mostly the US, the UK, and other OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) countries.² The literature generally portrays
unions as operating along at least three dimensions: their wage-making practices;
their participatory role in terms of negotiating and administering labour rules
related to hiring, training, promoting, and laying off workers; and their activities
as a pressure group on government (Pencavel 2005). Rather than attempting to
² See Betcherman (2012) for a review of the literature on labour market institutions in general.
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cover the enormous trade union literature as a whole, in this section I address the
wage dimension, which is the focus of this chapter, by providing a brief theoretical
discussion followed by a concise summary of the most relevant studies.
11.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
From a theoretical perspective, the trade union wage gap arises from trade unions
introducing a wedge between the reservation wage of the worker and the value of a
job, or in other words between labour supply and demand.³ The ability of the
union to achieve a wage rate that is higher than the non-union level depends on
various factors, including the power of the union to act as a monopolist in the
supply of labour, and the existence of economic rent or surplus in the product
market. In a bargaining model where all union members have the same prefer-
ences, wages will be higher the stronger the bargaining power of unions, and the
lower the responsiveness of labour demand (and profits) to wages. These relations
in turn depend on the competitiveness of the product market. In a perfectly
competitive market the union-imposed wedge is reduced, since a firm facing an
infinite elasticity of demand is unable to pass any union wage differential on to
prices. Thus, unions might be able to capture quasi-rents from capital in the short
run, but in the long run the firm would leave the market in search of a higher
return on capital, or be forced out by non-union firms with lower costs. In
addition to the economic factors, the extent of the union wage gap also depends
on the degree of coordination and centralization of wage determination activities
and the competitiveness of the labour market (Boeri and van Ours 2008).
In addition to the direct individual union wage premium, spill-over effects to
non-union members may occur in the presence of industry-level collective agree-
ments, and in most OECD countries union coverage (the share of workers covered
by a collective agreement) exceeds union density (union members as a percentage
of the workforce). Since collective agreements ensure that non-members, whether
firms or workers, are covered by the union-negotiated wage rate, union coverage is
often considered a more accurate measure of the bargaining power of unions than
density. The latter has been declining in many OECD countries since the 1980s,
and the option to free-ride on union-provided services and benefits is cited as one
of the reasons for this (Booth and Chatterji 1995; Boeri and van Ours 2008). In
the absence of extension rules, the wages of non-union workers are still likely to be
affected by the presence of unions—for instance through the ‘threat effect’ of
unionism, whereby non-union employers will pay wages that are comparable to
³ Booth and Chatterji (1995) and Boeri and van Ours (2008) provide comprehensive reviews of
trade union theory. See Lewis (1963, 1986) for earlier work on the union-related wage effect.
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those of unionized workers (Pencavel 2005). Alternatively, in the absence of such a
threat effect (but in the presence of unions), workers disemployed from union
firms due to a wage push will seek employment in non-union firms, shifting the
labour supply right and reducing wages in this sector below what they would be in
the absence of unions. Therefore, whether a threat effect exists or not, wage levels
are likely to be affected by the presence of unions.
11.2.2 Recent Empirical Evidence
Empirical work on the union–wage relationship has been based mostly on either
firm-level or individual data, yet since the 1990s a growing number of studies
using matched employer–employee data have emerged.⁴ For instance, Lalonde
et al. (1996) use American firm data to examine the effects of newly formed unions
on total output, employment, material purchases, wage rates, and productivity.
They find reductions in the first three, yet firms do not experience higher wage
rates. By contrast, in the UK, Hildreth and Pudney (1997) find higher wages
among unionized firms, and especially for individuals covered by a collective
agreement but who are not necessarily union members. Using matched
employer–employee data from Spain, Card and De La Rica (2006) find that
firm-level contracting is associated with a 5–10 per cent individual wage premium.
Moreover, the wage gain is larger for more highly paid workers, which is in
contrast to UK and US studies—where unions have tended to ‘flatten’ wages
across skill groups (Lewis 1986). This difference could, however, be related to
the fact that in the UK and US the comparison group is the non-union sector,
whereas in Spain it is the prevailing sectoral agreement.
As mentioned earlier, union studies covering the Global South are more
limited, and the findings are also more varied. For instance, Rama (2000)
states that in developing countries, unionized workers usually earn between
5 and 30 per cent more than non-unionized workers. In the same study, which
summarizes findings from Senegal and Cameroon, Rama (2000) shows union
membership to be associated with wages that are 8–12 per cent lower. This
atypical finding is attributed partly to the ‘subordinate’ nature of the labour
movement in these countries and the distortive labour market policies of the
1980s. This work then points to the importance of the nature of the links with the
government and political parties when it comes to how labour movements affect
wages. In the case of South Africa, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) show that the union
wage gap is as high as 145 per cent at the bottom decile of the wage distribution,
⁴ See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a review of methods and results using matched employer–
employee data. In their comprehensive review of studies on developed countries, Aidt and Tzannatos
(2002) find the union wage effect to be between 5% and 15%.
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whereas at the top decile there is flattening so that the difference is 11 per cent.
This study, however, is unable to account for important firm attributes, such as
size, which are likely to explain much of the union wage gap.
Among the few studies on the union wage premium in Asia, Korean estimates
suggest very small positive impacts in the 5–6 per cent range (Fields and Yoo 2000;
Park 1991). In a case study of ten Vietnamese firms, Clarke et al. (2007) document
that trade unions are able to negotiate wages that are 5 per cent higher than those
in non-union firms. Moreover, Edwards and Phan (2008) argue that since trade
unions in Vietnam are involved in the central wage decision-making processes,
wages would be lower were it not for their presence and influence. However, the
study provides no evidence of this.
Methodologically, the above studies are based on either qualitative assessments
or cross-sections of individual worker data, and are thus unable to account for
workplace characteristics or time-invariant factors. Seeking to fill this gap, an
earlier study based on matched firm–worker data from 2007 and 2009 (Torm
2014) found that union membership in Vietnamese small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) was associated with higher wages and the provision of social
benefits. The current study builds upon and extends this earlier work by con-
structing a balanced worker panel, allowing for a more comprehensive analysis.
Moreover, since 2014 a number of regulatory changes, as examined below, have
been implemented which could influence the results. To set the scene, the next
section provides an overview of Vietnamese trade unions and the context in which
they operate.
11.3 Trade Unions in the Vietnamese Context
Under central planning, trade unions functioned mostly as a ‘transmission belt’
for the ruling Communist Party, as described in Zhu and Fahey (2000). With
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy, a rights-based system for the regula-
tion of industrial relations has been established, allocating a more prominent role
to trade unions. As for most developing countries, data on union coverage and
membership is generally limited. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labour
(VGCL) provides the most reliable and recent statistics, as summarized in Torm
(2018). According to these figures, in 2011 the total number of unions in Vietnam
was just under 110,000, the majority of which were located in the state sector.
In the non-state sector, unions were found mostly within domestic enterprises
(77 per cent), whereas union incidence among foreign direct investment (FDI)
enterprises remains relatively low (13 per cent). In terms of union density, this
was 26 per cent across the enterprise sector as a whole in 2011, compared with
16 per cent at the national level (including public servants and armed forces).
Total union membership was 7.3 million in 2011, with a slightly higher share in
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the state sector, yet considering that this sector accounts for two-thirds of unions,
the membership ratio appears to be higher in the private sector, as also evidenced
by the density figures. More recent figures from 2014 estimate total union
membership to be 8.6 million (not reported), thus, assuming a stable wage-
earner population, this indicates an increase in union membership over time.⁵
Regarding collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), as indicated in Torm (2018),
national coverage in 2011 was 28 per cent, and was highest in the state sector,
at 71 per cent, followed by foreign firms at 54 per cent and domestic firms at
31 per cent. Among unionized establishments the rate was around 67 per cent.⁶
11.3.1 The Legal Framework
The Amended Labor Code (ALC) and the new Union Law (NUL) both became
effective in early 2013.⁷ In the ALC chapter XIII, on trade unions, the purpose of
firm-based unions is clearly stated as follows: ‘trade unions serve to represent and
protect the lawful and legitimate rights and interests of trade union members and
workers; participate in negotiating, signing, and monitoring the implementation
of CBAs, wage scales and wage tables, work norms, wage payment regulations, and
bonus regulations among others’. The ALC further stipulates that labour contracts
are deemed invalid if, among other circumstances, ‘the contract contains an
agreement that prohibits or obstructs the employee from forming or joining
a trade union’. In addition to protecting the rights and interests of their members,
trade union representatives are involved in compliance procedures as stipulated
in the NUL, including the implementation of regimes and policies for the
employees, such as compliance with minimum wage provisions. The NUL does
not, however, set out specific requirements for wages to be above the minimum or
average wage in a particular industry, and thus the wage level depends on the
bargaining power of the involved parties. However, the employer must consult
the executive committee of the enterprise trade union on the formulation of wage
scales and labour rates.
The NUL also outlines the functions, tasks, and participation of trade unions in
inspecting, supervising, and monitoring the activities of agencies, organizations,
and enterprises, and confirms the rights of employees to establish and join trade
unions and to participate in trade union activities. Although enterprise trade
⁵ The VGCL had set a target of recruiting around 600,000 new union members every year between
2013 and 2018 (VGCL 2015).
⁶ To the extent that the figures are comparable this indicates an increase over time, as Clarke et al.
(2007) estimated only 20% of unionised private sector firms to have collective agreements (although in
Ho Chi Minh City the figure is around 65%).
⁷ See Decree No. 10/2012/QH13, and No. 12/2012/QH13, for details on the ALC and the NUL
respectively.
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unions are free to independently represent workers’ rights and interests, all trade
unions in Vietnam are required to affiliate with the VGCL—the higher-level trade
union which is the only legal trade union for Vietnamese workers. The VGCL
collaborates closely with the local labour department under the supervision of the
relevant (Communist) Party body, and this subordination of the trade union to
the Party means that workplace trade unions have limited independence and
ability to act as a pressure group on government. Moreover, given that trade
unions are generally headed by management rather than senior staff members,
they are characterized also by weak representational capacity in that dimension.
Compared with the earlier Trade Union Law (1994), the NUL incorporates
some major changes, including the requirement for all companies, whether
foreign-invested or local, to pay a mandatory union fee of 2 per cent of the total
payroll as a social insurance contribution, even if the enterprise has no trade
union. The 2 per cent levy is to be used for activities at all levels of trade unions,
including the upper-level trade union, which will collect the payment and subse-
quently distribute part of the fund to the enterprise trade union. Thus, this points
to an increased centralization of the ownership of all trade union assets under the
VGCL. Another new dimension of the NUL, as also outlined in the ALC, is that
the immediate upper-level trade union (usually at the district level) has the right
and obligation to represent and protect the legitimate and lawful rights and
interests of workers in situations where a grassroots (local) trade union has not
been established. Previously, this was only based on employees’ requests, with no
automatic default protection for workers in non-union firms. In fact, the ALC lays
out a number of provisions, including six months’ maternity leave, a two-year
work permit, and revised working and rest times, which appear to strengthen the
position of employees and decrease management flexibility. The impacts of these
amendments on employers and the economy as a whole remain to be seen.
11.3.2 Collective Bargaining
The ALC has sought to strengthen collective bargaining by extending the right of
workers in non-unionized enterprises to be covered by a relevant collective
agreement. The negotiation and monitoring of collective agreements provides
an important ‘test’ of the effectiveness of firm trade unions in representing the
interests of their members, and collective agreements should in principle include
agreed wage and bonus scales.⁸ Aside from the fact that one-third of unionized
⁸ Note that on 5 July 2019, Vietnam deposited the instrument of ratification of the Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining Convention, set out by the International Labour Organization (ILO), but has
not yet ratified the international convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise.
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firms do not have such agreements (Torm 2018), the actual substance of collective
agreements is questionable, since they offer few benefits for covered workers
beyond conditions provided for by law. For example, a 2009 joint review between
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and trade unions found that most
agreements in Vietnam were initiated by employers to fulfil corporate social
responsibility requirements rather than as a consequence of genuine labour–
management negotiations (Grimshaw and de Bustillo 2016), demonstrating
employers’ unwillingness to bargain effectively. Furthermore, collective bargain-
ing rules purposely exclude many categories of workers, such as public sector
workers, foreign enterprise workers, subcontracted workers, etc., which is not very
conducive to achieving labour market inclusion.
The combination of weaknesses in collective bargaining mechanisms and
enterprise unions’ weak representation capacity as discussed above have meant
that workers have resorted to ‘collective bargaining by riots’. Such wildcat strikes,
in which workers—without the leadership of union officials—have demanded
wages higher than the minimum levels and better working conditions, peaked in
2008 and again in 2011, years during which inflation levels were also high and
therefore real wages low. In fact, over 70 per cent of around 5,000 strikes which
happened between 1995 and 2011 were on the basis of interests rather than
rights only (Chi and Torm 2015). The garment industry, characterized by a
combination of low wages and poor working conditions, is the most strike-prone
sector in Vietnam, accounting for 34 per cent of all nationwide strikes recorded
during 1995–2014 (VGCL 2015). However, since 2010, when the first sectoral
agreement for the garment industry was signed, efforts have been underway to
construct the foundations for more effective and resilient sector-level bargaining.
There are no official statistics on CBA coverage in the garment industry, yet the
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs estimates the CBA coverage to be
50 per cent of unionized companies in 2012 (Chi and Torm 2015). This is below
the average coverage rate of 67 per cent among unionized establishments, as
shown in Torm (2018).
The pressure of labour activism has made a growing number of employers
adjust their authoritarian approach to wage fixing by allowing for more partici-
pation of rank-and-file workers, and their representatives, in de facto wage
negotiations. Nevertheless, as long as the representation capacity of enterprise
unions remains weak, such models of de facto wage negotiations do not provide a
realistic alternative to collective bargaining. Given this combination of weak union
leadership, absence of specific requirements on wage levels, and ineffective col-
lective bargaining, the extent to which unions are associated with higher wages
becomes an empirical question. Against this background, I now turn to analysing
the union wage premium among Vietnamese SMEs.
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11.4 Data and Econometric Approach
11.4.1 Data
The chapter is based on matched employer–employee data from two SME surveys,
carried out during 2013–15 (Rand et al. 2014). In both years, the surveys included
a separate employee module consisting of randomly sampled employees from a
random subsample of firms stratified by location. Between one and seven workers
were interviewed in each firm, representing different categories. In Vietnam,
household firms are not officially registered by the central authorities under the
different enterprise laws (although they are listed by local officials), and as such
are not covered by the Trade Union Law.⁹ In other words establishing a trade
union is only mandatory for firms with more than ten workers and therefore not
for household firms. This is evidenced in the data, where only non-household
firms report having established firm-level unions and there are no union mem-
bers observed among household firms. For these reasons, I exclude household
firms, and focus solely on firms categorized as private enterprises, cooperatives/
collectives/partnerships (CCPs), and limited liability and joint stock companies.
After applying this selection criterion and undertaking a thorough data cleaning,
including checking the consistency of time-invariant variables between the two
survey rounds, I was left with an unbalanced panel of 1,594 permanent workers:
885 in 2013, and 709 in 2015, corresponding to 301 firms. Through identifying
repeatedly surveyed employees, I construct a balanced employee panel consist-
ing of 758 individual observations (379 in each year), corresponding to 152
repeated firms.¹⁰
11.4.2 Econometric Approach
In order to analyse the union–wage relationship, I estimate an equation where
individual wages depend on both worker attributes and the characteristics of the
firm where the worker is employed. Building on the basic model of Abowd and
Kramarz (1999), the specification takes the following for
lnYijt ¼ αþ Xijtβþ Zjtγþ Uijtδþ εijt: ð11:1Þ
Where the log of (real) individual wages for worker i in firm j at time t depends on
a set of individual worker characteristics ðXijtÞ and a vector of firm-level covariates
for the firm where worker i is employed ðZjtÞ. Our main variable of interest ðUijtÞ
⁹ For more detail on coverage see NUL No. 12/2012/QH13, article 3.
¹⁰ The reason for restricting the analysis to two survey rounds is to be able to construct a balanced
panel of workers. Since the employee module was not intended to capture repeat workers, adding an
additional year would reduce the balanced panel substantially, or even make it impossible to
construct one.
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is an indicator for whether the individual is a member of a firm-level trade union.
Finally, there is the worker-specific error term ðεijtÞ.
In estimating Equation (11.1), several potential biases are taken into account.
First, in order to address the possibility of autocorrelation arising from repeated
observations over time, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
This allows for intragroup (within-firm) correlation over time and between
workers, while maintaining the assumption that the observations are independent
across firms. Second, bias may arise from the presence of unobserved individual
heterogeneity, such as worker ability, which influences both wages and union
membership. For example, an observed wage differential between unionized and
non-unionized workers may arise simply because the workers who are most likely
to become union members are also the ones with the highest unobserved abilities.
In order to account for such worker fixed effects (FE), e.g. ability, in the wage
specification, we estimate Equation (11.1) using the balanced panel. Third, bias
may arise if changes in union-related policies (for instance as result of the newTrade
Union Law which came into effect 1 January 2013) that influence membership are
also correlated with changes in wages. To overcome these potential sources of
endogeneity bias, I use standard matching techniques to control for determining
factors and selected observed time-varying factors that may simultaneously influ-
ence the decision to unionize and subsequent wage outcomes. More specifically,
I compare differences in wages between workers who unionized in the period
2013–15 and similar workers who remained non-unionized in the 2015 survey.
Finally, I use IV (instrumental variable) identification in order to control for
time-varying unobserved characteristics, e.g. if the decision to unionize is a
function of the perceived wage increase, beyond what is captured by unobserved
fixed effects (ability) or observed changes in firm/worker attributes. To instrument
for union membership (the endogenous variable), I use the share of firms that
have unions, by district and four-digit sector. In order to be able to assess the
validity of the instrument (test for overidentifying restrictions), I use a second
instrument—the share of firms reporting having good knowledge of the Labour
Code, again by district and four-digit sector. The key assumptions of this identi-
fication strategy are that (a) the IVs are strongly correlated with the individual
union membership, and (b) after adding the full set of worker and firm controls,
the selected instruments have no independent influence on individual wage
outcomes. If the IV assumptions hold, any observed relationship between union
status and wages has a causal interpretation for workers whose union membership
status is affected by the instrument (Angrist et al. 1996).
11.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 11.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the unbalanced panel. First, the
main variable of interest is union membership, taking the value 1 if the worker is a
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member of a union and 0 otherwise. Union membership averages 29 per cent and
increased from 27 per cent to 32 per cent over 2013–15. Next, the outcome
variable is the logged monthly real basic wage, which in nominal terms increased
from 3.7 to 4.6 million Vietnamese dong (VND) over 2013–15. The increase in the
real wage is less steep, from 3.2 to 3.7 VND million over 2013–15.¹¹
In terms of worker attributes, I control for gender, age, and education and
training of the worker, as well as job function, hiring method, and reasons for
choosing current job. The justifications for the selection of these covariates and
their summary statistics are as follows. First, previous studies on Vietnam (Bjerge
et al. 2016; Torm 2014) have shown substantial gender wage gaps, which are also
commonly found in other developing country studies (Jones 2001). Thus,
I incorporate a gender dummy and Table 11.1 shows that 55 per cent of the
sample are male workers. Second, I control for the age of the worker as a proxy for
experience—a key variable in the standard human capital earnings function
(Mincer 1974)—and include age squared to allow for a diminishing marginal
effect. The average worker age is 36 years. Third, I include a series of education
indicator variables, since educational attainment explains a large share of the
variation in earnings across individuals (Mincer 1974; Spence 1973). Moreover,
this also removes some of the bias arising from the possibility that unionized
firms may hire better-quality workers. Around 64 per cent of the sample have
finished secondary education, while the share of workers with a higher education
is 34 per cent, and this has risen over time. Fourth, the different job functions
are included as dummy variables on the basis that both wages and union mem-
bership are likely to vary substantially across occupation categories, beyond
what is accounted for by education. The largest share is production workers, at
48 per cent—a share that has increased over time, whereas managers and profes-
sional and service workers have seen declining shares over 2013–15. Fifth,
I include a dummy variable for whether the worker found their job through an
informal contact (knowing the owner or someone who works in the firm) as
opposed to via a formal contact (advertisement, employment agency, etc.), as this
has been shown to be associated with higher individual wages (Larsen et al. 2011).
Informal hiring remains the most common recruitment mechanism, at 67 per cent
of workers, yet with a slight decrease over time—an indication of increased
formalization of the Vietnamese labour market. Sixth, training incidence is
added since this has been shown to have an impact on workers’ wages in Vietnam
(Bjerge et al. 2016). In addition, theoretical models have predicted that union
workers receive more training and higher returns to training than non-union
workers.¹² Seventh, based on the reasoning that job choice preferences may be
related to both union status and wages, two indicator variables are included
¹¹ Real wages are deflated using province-level deflators, where the base is Hanoi, year 2010.
¹² See for instance, Booth and Chatterji (1995).
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Table 11.1 Summary statistics
2013 2015 All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Member of a trade union 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45
Nominal monthly wage
VND1,000
3,733.50 1,306.09 4,643.70 2,213.03 4,138.35 1,824.29
Real monthly wage
VND1,000
3,178.79 1,073.89 3,652.00 1,758.40 3,389.27 1,438.58
Gender (male = 1) 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50
Worker age 34.14 9.35 38.65 9.32 36.15 9.60
None 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.07
Primary school 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12
Secondary school 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.64 0.48
College and higher 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47
Manager 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.31
Professional worker 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
Office worker 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34
Sales worker 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Service worker 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
Production worker 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50
Informally hired 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47
Training 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.22 0.41
Job choice conditions 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Job choice salary 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44
Firm size 34.22 39.73 41.64 48.66 37.52 44.07
Private 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
Collective 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Limited liability 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49
Joint stock 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35
Urban 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49
Sector low value added 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Sector medium value added 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Sector high value added 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Wage negotiations 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Owner is male 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50
Owner has higher education 0.95 0.22 0.97 0.17 0.96 0.20
Share of women in labour
force
0.41 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.41 0.22
Share of professionals 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Share of casual workers 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.15
Observations 885 709 1,594
Note: Summary statistics are for the unbalanced panel. Real wages are deflated using province-level
deflators. VND20,500 is around US$1.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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representing whether the worker chose their current job due to working condi-
tions or for salary reasons. Table 11.1 shows that 23 per cent indicate having
selected their job due to better working conditions and 26 per cent due to a higher
salary—both have risen over time, indicating that workers are having more
influence on the kinds of jobs they attain.
Turning to firm characteristics, I include firm size, legal status, location, sector,
wage determination method, owners’ gender and education, and the share of
professional workers, casual workers, and women. First, firm size (logged) is to
account for the commonly found firm-size wage premium (Oi and Idson 1999;
Söderbom et al. 2005), and the possibility that larger firms may be more likely to
be unionized. The average firm has 38 workers, and this has increased over time.
Second, due to the substantial variation in wages and unionization across firm
ownership types, I incorporate dummies for the different legal categories. In fact,
ownership form has been shown to be a critical factor influencing human resource
practices, including in relation to trade unions (Zhu et al. 2008). Limited liability
companies comprise the largest category at 60 per cent, followed by private firms
at 20 per cent, joint stock companies at 14 per cent, and finally CCPs at 6 per cent.
The share of limited liability companies has increased over time, while the share of
private firms has fallen, in line also with the overall rise in firm size. Third, I also
control for firm location, as wages and human resource initiatives differ across
provinces (Zhu et al. 2008), possibly due to the relative autonomy of provinces in
the implementation of centrally planned initiatives (Nguyen et al. 2007).
Table 11.1 shows that 58 per cent of firms are located in urban areas (Ho Chi
Minh City, Hanoi, and Hai Phong). Fourth, wage returns and human resource
practices may vary across sectors of production (Zhu et al. 2008), and thus
I control for the different sectors. The majority of firms fall into the medium-
value-added category, and this is increasing over time. Fifth, around 33 per cent of
firms respond that individual wage negotiation, which is likely to be associated
with both individual wages and union membership, was the most important
determinant of wages.
Sixth, the gender of the owner has been shown to be important in terms of
compensation, with female owners being more generous in the provision of non-
wage benefits (Rand and Tarp 2011). Between 2013 and 2015, female-owned firms
became more dominant, as indicated by the fall in male-owned firms from 50 to
44 per cent. Seventh, as well-educated managers are more likely to hire well-
educated workers (Rosenbaum et al. 1999), I include a dummy indicating whether
the owner has at least high school education. The share is very high, at 96 per cent,
and increasing over time. Eighth, the share of female workers is included because
this is likely to be correlated with lower overall wage outcomes, given the gender
wage gap (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Ninth, the share of professional workers acts
as a proxy for the general skills level of the workforce, which could be (positively)
correlated with unobserved worker-specific ability. Moreover, if, as a result of
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unionization, firms choose to hire better-quality workers such that productivity
increases are commensurate with the union-imposed higher wage (Lewis 1986),
average worker quality would eliminates the bias that might arise from a positive
correlation between union status and worker quality. Professionals make up
around 9 per cent of the workforce, and the share is stable over time. Tenth, the
casual workforce share (measured as the average number of casual workers
relative to the average number of full-time regular workers in a year) is included
as a measure of the stability of employment contracts, as this could be related to
both union and wage outcomes. Given that the sample considers only formal
firms, it is not surprising to see a relatively low share of casual workers, at around
6 per cent.
The appendix in Torm (2018) shows differences in firm and worker character-
istics by union membership status. As expected, (raw) wages are higher for union
members, and women are more likely to be union members. Union members are
slightly older than non-union members, but this is not significant. Union mem-
bers are well educated and are significantly more likely to have a college education
compared with non-union workers, who are more likely to have stopped studying
after secondary school. In line with the education figures, managers, office work-
ers, sales workers, and service workers are significantly more likely to be union
members (professionals also, but not significantly), whereas among production
workers non-unionization is more common. Union members are less likely to
have been hired informally, and training incidence is substantially higher among
unionized workers—as would be expected given that unions have a longer time
horizon and promote the value of training, and as also predicted by theory (Booth
and Chatterji 1995). The incidence of workers who chose their current job due to
the salary is lower among union members, indicating that higher wages are not a
driver of unionization. As expected, union members tend to work in larger limited
liability companies (and CCP firms), located in Ho Chi Minh City and Quang
Nam, whereas private, more rurally based firms have a higher share of non-union
members. Moreover, union workers are found in firms with highly educated
female owners, and a higher share of professional workers. Finally, in terms of
sectors, the ratio of union members is significantly higher in wood, chemical
products, and fabricated metal products.
11.5 Results
Table 11.2 shows the relation between union membership and individual wages.
In column 1, when employee attributes only are included, the union wage gap is
13 per cent, yet when the first set of firm-level characteristics (size, legal status,
sector, and location) are added in column 2, the wage premium falls to 10 per cent,
although this is still highly significant. In column 3, the second set of firm-level
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characteristics are added (owner gender and education, workforce shares, and
wage determinant), and the union coefficient remains just over 10 per cent. In
order to account for the possibility that unobserved worker heterogeneity is
driving the results, I use the balanced panel of workers to control for worker
fixed effects (i.e. ability or motivation). Column 4 shows that the union wage gap
Table 11.2 Wages and union membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS FE bal.
Member of a trade union 0.133*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.091*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.055)
Gender (male = 1) 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.097***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Worker age 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age squared 0.306*** 0.266*** 0.261***
(0.078) (0.066) (0.066)
Manager 0.308*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.191**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.082)
Professional worker 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.101
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.071)
Office worker 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.007
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055)
Sales worker 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.067
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.073)
Service worker 0.042 0.054** 0.062** 0.067
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.080)
Informally hired 0.023 0.007 0.007 0.038
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037)
Training 0.016 0.005 0.004 0.008
(0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.051)
Job choice conditions 0.000 0.015 0.020 0.027
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041)
Job choice salary 0.058*** 0.042** 0.032 0.013
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040)
Firm size and education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal ownership, sector and location
controls
No Yes Yes Yes
Owner gender and education No No Yes Yes
Workforce shares and wage
determinant
No No Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.21
Number of groups 379
Observations 1,594 1,594 1,594 758
Notes: OLS are based on the unbalanced panel. Year dummy included in all specifications. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/1/2020, SPi
244     ?
remains when worker fixed effects are accounted for, yet the size of the coefficient
drops slightly, to 9 per cent, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is positively
correlated with union membership. This suggests that higher-ability workers are
more likely to be unionized. This is in line with Torm (2018), which showed that
among union members the education category that comprises the highest union
member share is college education, whereas among non-union workers the share
falls as education levels rise. Also as shown in Torm (2018), non-production
workers are more likely to be in unions than production workers. The small
difference in the OLS and FE union coefficient is reassuring and indicates that
the numerous controls account for a large share of ability/other unobserved
heterogeneity. Assuming that the union membership contribution, which
amounts to 2 per cent of wages (and which, as outlined earlier, is now a mandatory
fee imposed on the employer), has not been deducted in the reported wage, the
real wage gain would be slightly lower. The results are in accordance with Clarke
et al. (2007) and Torm (2014).¹³
As for the individual worker attributes, these generally conform to human
capital theory. First, there is a substantial gender wage gap, with male earnings
being around 10 per cent higher than those of women, depending on the exact
specification. This is in line with similar studies (Bjerge et al. 2016) and appears to
have fallen slightly over time (Liu 2004; Torm 2014). Second, the age of the worker
is also highly significant and has the expected concave effect, with a maximum at
around 40 years of age. Third, the different occupation categories indicate a
substantial wage premium compared with production workers, especially for
managers, who earn around 30 per cent more—although this falls to 19 per cent
when ability is accounted for in the fixed effects specification. Fourth, as expected,
wages are higher if the worker has chosen their job based on the salary. With
regard to education (not reported), the results show positive and increasing
returns, with a college graduate having a wage that is 19 per cent higher than
that of a worker with no education. Yet when the firm-level control variables are
added the significance disappears.
For presentational purposes, firm-level variables are not reported, yet larger
firms pay significantly higher wages (Söderbom et al. 2005) and individuals
working in a CCP have significantly lower wages compared with private-firm
employees. Education and gender of the firm owner are not well determined, yet
the share of women in the workforce is significantly negative and indicates that
shifting from a 0 to a 100 per cent female worker share is associated with
approximately a 13 per cent lower wage bill, which is in line with similar studies
(Card and De La Rica 2006). Both the temporary worker and professional
¹³ Similarly, in the case of Spain, Card and De La Rica (2006) showed that unions were associated
with a 5–10% individual wage premium.
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worker shares are insignificant, the latter possibly due to being accounted for by
the individual education variables. The location controls (not reported) show
that workers in urban areas (Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) earn more than
those based in rural areas. This is most likely because firms in urban areas pay
an efficiency wage in order to attract more productive workers. This is in line
with the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index (Malesky 2009), according
to which Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City ranked no. 1 and no. 4 respectively in
the 2014 labour policy sub-index, which among other components includes a
measure of labour quality (PCI 2015). High-value-added sectors (especially
transport equipment and furniture) generally pay higher wages than low-
value-added sectors, yet medium-value-added sectors (in particular rubber and
refined petroleum) generally pay lower wages than low-value-added sectors.
Further, the year dummy shows an increase in real wages of about 6 per cent
over 2013–15.
In Table 11.3 I zoom in on those workers who became union members between
2013–15 and compare the difference in their wages to that of similar workers who
remained non-unionized in 2015. This matching approach is applied to take
account of determining factors and selected observed time-varying factors that
may simultaneously influence the decision to unionize and subsequent wage
outcomes. In terms of control variables, column 1 corresponds to the first column
of Table 11.2, column 2 to the second, and column 3 to the third. In column 1,
when only employee characteristics (all lagged) are included, the union coefficient
is just below 15 per cent, which is reasonably in line with Table 11.2. However,
once firm controls are added, becoming a union member increases wages by
between 22–28 per cent, depending on the number and type of firm-level controls.
Table 11.3 Impact of union membership on wages, matching estimates
(1) (2) (3)
ATET ATET ATET
Becoming union member 0.147** 0.277** 0.222**
(0.066) (0.119) (0.103)
Treated 38 38 38
Observations 275 275 275
Notes: Average treatment effect of the treated (ATET) using bias-corrected nearest-neighbour match-
ing (four matches per observation). Estimations done using the ‘teffects nnmatch’ command in Stata
(Abadie and Imbens 2006, 2011). Matching is based on initial 2013 observed characteristics as
documented in the corresponding columns in Table 11.5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
independent and identically distributed (iid). Matched difference-in-difference (DD) estimates
are comparable, yet the coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude (results available upon request).
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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The matched results, however, do not consider the endogeneity bias arising from
the possibility of workers self-selecting into unions due to unobserved time-
varying factors that also simultaneously influence individual wages.¹⁴
Thus, in order to deal with potential unobserved time-varying factors, in
Table 11.4 I present the instrumental variables estimation (2SLS), using the
instruments as described earlier, and the results confirm the positive effect of
union membership on wages of workers. Columns 1a and 1b are based on the
unbalanced panel, showing a union wage gap of 12 per cent—which, reassuringly,
is in line with the earlier results in Tables 10.2 and 10.3. As seen in the first-stage
estimation in column 1b, the chosen instruments are significantly related to union
membership. In column 2b, based on the balanced panel, the union coefficient is
higher (21 per cent) than the FE in Table 11.2, but comparable to the matching
estimate in Table 11.3. As reported in the bottom rows of Table 11.4, the joint test
of significance (F-stat) indicates that the instruments are jointly statistically
significant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the validity of the instruments is
confirmed by the Sargan and Basmann tests of overidentifying restrictions (OID),
whereby I am unable to reject that the instruments are valid. All in all, this suggest
that the chosen instruments influence wages only through their effect on union
membership.
The preceding results are all based on the mean distribution of wages, yet in
Torm (2018) the possibility that the effects of union membership vary over
different parts of the conditional wage distribution is analysed using a set of
(semi-parametric) quantile regressions. Interestingly, the results reveal that the
union membership gain increases considerably as we move up the wage distribu-
tion. Thus, unions in Vietnam do not seem to be bargaining as effectively on
behalf of those at the lower end of the wage distribution, and this bias towards the
more skilled segment of the workforce is in part related to the management
structure and political subordination of unions, as discussed earlier. This differs
from previous similar studies. For instance, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) find that
in South Africa there are large union effects at the lower part of the wage
distribution and that these decrease towards the top. In the case of Ghana,
Blunch and Verner (2004) show a union membership premium which is signifi-
cant only for the tenth quantile. Similarly, in the US, Chamberlain (1994) dem-
onstrates that union membership has a larger effect on the lower quantiles than on
the higher quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages, and in the case of the
UK public sector, Manquilef-Bächler et al. (2009) find a higher union wage return
at the bottom of the distribution among males, while for females the premium is
constant across the wage distribution.
¹⁴ In addition to nearest-neighbour matching I also use double-difference matching, and the results
are qualitatively the same, yet the coefficients are smaller in magnitude in all columns (result available
upon request).
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The current analysis compares the wages between union members (in union-
ized firms) and non-union members (in union and non-union firms). However,
these two groups may not be directly comparable, because the latter have not been
faced with the choice of becoming union members, unless they purposely chose to
work in a non-unionized firm. Thus, the observed wage difference may simply
reflect the differential between being employed in a unionized versus a non-
unionized firm, rather than the individual wage gain associated with union
membership. In Torm (2018) the fact that that about 20 per cent of workers
in unionized firms are not union members, is exploited to test the wage gap within
unionized firms only. The results show that within unionized firms, the wage gain
from being a union member remains significant, and close to the estimates
presented in Table 11.2. Thus, what is observed throughout the current analysis
is the direct union membership premium—rather than spill-over effects from
there being a union at the firm, allowing non-union members to free-ride on
union members. This finding is not surprising given the low prevalence of
collective agreements and lack of effective bargaining in general.
11.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the union wage premium among Vietnamese manu-
facturing SMEs using matched employer–employee survey data over 2013–15. In
contrast to the situation in many developed countries, union membership is on
the rise in Vietnam, and recent regulatory changes are said to have strengthened
Table 11.4 Wages and union membership, IV estimates
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
First stage Wages First stage Wages
Member of a trade union 0.116*** 0.211***
(0.035) (0.044)
Trade union—share of firms 0.706*** 0.756***
(0.033) (0.045)















Note: 2SLS estimations on the unbalanced sample (columns 1a and 1b) and the balanced panel
(columns 2a and 2b). Control variables are the same as in Table 11.5, column 3. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SME data (Rand et al. 2014).
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the position of employees vis-à-vis management. At the same time, however, the
NUL contains elements which imply increased centralization of trade union
assets, in turn adding to already limited union autonomy and representative
power. These aspects, coupled with the transitional environment in which unions
operate, make Vietnam an interesting case study.
Methodologically, the main contribution of the chapter, compared with similar
studies, is that the data set allows for the construction of a balanced worker panel,
making it possible to account for observed and unobserved time-varying factors
which may influence both union status and wage outcomes. The results show that
union membership is associated with higher individual earnings when both firm
and employee characteristics are controlled for, and that this effect holds when
using an IV approach to take account of unobserved time-varying factors.
Depending on the analytical approaches adopted, the union wage premium ranges
from 9 to 21 per cent.
The variation in the union-wage gap arises from the fact that union member-
ship gains are particularly high for workers in higher-level positions, in turn
implying a widening of the wage-skill differential, which is somewhat concerning.
Potentially, this could be countered by local trade unions more adequately repre-
senting all workers’ rights equally, as well as playing an imperative role in ensuring
that compliance with labour regulations is upheld. The fact that the incidence of
firm-based trade unions is on the rise is positive, yet their ability to act in the
interests of their members depends to a large extent on the existence and exten-
sion of collective agreements based on effective and inclusive bargaining. In this
area, Vietnam still has work to do.
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